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Social psychologists define, examine, and
construct scientific theories of human social
behavior. One of the most interesting aspects
of social psychology is that social behavior is
defined in a multitude of ways, ranging from
directly observable, measurable, and publicly
presented (e.g., kissing), to indirect, subtle,
and internal (e.g., a smirk, religious beliefs).
Topics of interest to social psychologists
are many and include self and identity, social
beliefs and judgments, attitudes and behavior,
language and communication, culture, social
influence, and conformity, persuasion, social
relations, groups, attraction and intimacy, as
well as applications of these in social arenas
such as organizations and business, health,
the environment, and the justice system.
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Graham Richards (2002) has identified sev-
eral key phases in the development of the
discipline. According to Richards, the major
points of development in social psychology
were: nineteenth-century France; United
States in the 1920s and 1930s; Britain and
United States in the 1960s onwards; and the
“crisis” in social psychology of the 1980s,
and the current climate. Nineteenth-century
France is the location of the first identifi-
able social psychological text. Gustav LeBon
(1896, cited in Richards 2002), inThe Crowd:
A Study of the Popular Mind, influenced by
current cultural concepts of hypnosis and
contagion, identified “the crowd” as a prob-
lematical element to explain France’s social
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unrest at that time, which was underpinned
by the rising forces of anti-Semitism and Far
Right politics. In this work, the crowd was
seen as the necessary unit to be examined and
analyzed. The solution, for LeBon lay in the
identification of the laws of crowd behavior.
Individualism, the currently popular man-
ifestation of the proper unit of analysis for
social psychologists and which foregrounded
the social cognitivist perspective that we
know today, first came to prominence at the
turn of the century through to the 1920s
in the United States. Triplett (1898, cited in
Richards 2002), who examined social facili-
tation effects (does the presence of another
person increase performance?) in various
scenarios, for example, among cyclists or
children fishing and so forth, is considered
to be the person to have conducted the first
social psychological experiment. Further
experimental work followed. Generally, this
early work in 1920s America was concerned
with analyzing the motives of people living
“in social relations.” It is possible to see how
the social psychological interest in social
interactions (e.g., criminality) would arise
during this period in the United States – a
New World, people living in ever-larger
cities with all of their evolving issues, as
well as volatile changes such as the “Roaring
Twenties” followed by the Great Depression
(1929–1933) and its attendant prosperity for
some but not for others (for example, African
Americans and farmers remained in poverty)
created an interest in the individual and
their situation, unfettered by long-standing
class and genealogy lines so prescient in
Europe. This is the epoch when social psy-
chology cemented its interested in people’s
thoughts and feelings – the individual, as
a useful unit of study, came to the fore. By
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the 1930s, social psychology in the United
States was changing rapidly, exploding in in
the number of publications and new research
methodologies (e.g., observational methods).
Psychological monographs covering unem-
ployment, mass media and public opinion,
race prejudice, delinquency, and industrial
conflict were all products of this period.
Thus, social psychology in the 1920s and
1930s United States was characterized by the
creation of experimental social psychology
that was both individualist and pragmatic (a
focus on applied research assumed great focus
at this time), where measurement of attitudes
became important (Gordon Allport consid-
ered as the “father” of attitude theory), and
there was an increase in numerous method-
ologies. During this period, British, and
more generally European social psychology
came to the fore. These social psychologies
differed from their American counterpart
in several distinctive ways. Although British
social psychology borrowed heavily from
American methods and concerns, it nev-
ertheless exhibited idiosyncratic foci and
topics of interest. British social psychology
emerged predominantly after World War II
and, just as with American social psychology,
was heavily influenced and stimulated by
the conflict. Distinctive British features of
social psychology included: a theorization
of social class (theorized here both as a
cultural and economic variable) that was
not evident in its American counterpart, a
greater use of observational methods than
American social psychology, and a greater
reception to insights from evolutionary the-
ory. In addition, British research was, and
remains, heavily influenced by European
social psychology with its focus on social
groups, collective identities, and intergroup
conflict (promoted by Henri Tajfel and his
students). American postwar period consti-
tuted an interest in a wide range of topics
such as authoritarianism, conformity, prej-
udice, small group dynamics and the nature
of leadership, attitudes, communication and
the media, and role theory, among others.
Interest in these topics was undoubtedly
stimulated by the influx of highly intellectual
European academics to America and was
also foregrounded by sociohistorical events
of that time: the Vietnam War in the 1960s
and the growth of political activism such as
that of second-wave feminism, concerns with
the rise of Nazism, and civil rights activism
during that period.
Research in social psychology has con-
tinued to expand rapidly and diversify from
the 1960s to the present day. The 1960s saw
research on topics such as aggression, proso-
cial behavior, and interpersonal relationships
come to the fore. Social cognition became
a prominent way to theorize human social
behavior from the 1970s.The 1970s and 1980s
also saw some tensions within the discipline
in what can be characterized as “the crisis
years” (Hogg and Vaughan 2014), which doc-
umented worries that social psychology was
overly reductionist, positivistic, and devoid
of a social theory of language. These tensions
and debates have resulted in a theoretically
vibrant and methodologically diverse social
psychology of today.
FAMOUS EXPERIMENTS
The postwar era in American social psychol-
ogy was also when some of the most famous
experiments in social psychology were con-
ducted. Key concerns of the researchers who
had emigrated to America and had been
directly affected by the European develop-
ments in anti-Semitism/rise of Nazism clearly
played a significant role in these experiments.
Social influence, in all its manifestations,
became an important behavior to under-
stand. Were people generally passive and
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open to influence? Would and could they
resist others’ directives? Will others influence
our judgments even in the face of clearly
wrong information?Which factors play a role
when someone is telling you to harm another?
How does power lead to aggression and vio-
lence? These are some of the questions posed
by what are arguable the three best-known
but also controversial experiments in the his-
tory of social psychology – Solomon Asch’s
conformity experiments, Stanley Milgram’s
obedience experiments at Yale in 1961, and
Philip Zimbardo’s prison experiments at
Stanford.
Solomon Asch (1951, cited in Hogg and
Vaughan 2014) conducted several studies
into what became known as his “conformity”
studies. Male university students were asked
to take part in supposedly a simple exper-
iment on “visual perception.” Participants
were invited into a room with seven or eight
other people – in reality, only one person
was the genuine participant while the others
were the “confederates,” primed as to the real
purpose of the study. How would the real
participant react to the majority confederates’
actions, especially when these actions were
wrong? All participants were shown a card
with a line on it, followed by a card with
three lines on it (lines labeled A, B, and C,
respectively). Participants were then asked to
say aloud which line (i.e., A, B, or C) matched
the line on the first card in length. Each line
question was called a “trial.” Prior to the
experiment, all confederates were given spe-
cific instructions on how they should respond
to each trial. Specifically, they were told to
unanimously give the correct response or
unanimously give the incorrect response.The
groupwas set up such that the real participant
was always the last to respond (i.e., the real
participant sat toward the end of a table). For
the first two trials, the participant would feel
at ease in the experiment, as he and the con-
federates gave the obvious, correct answer.
On the third trial, the confederates would all
give the same wrong answer. How would the
participant react?The aim was to see whether
the real participant would change his answer
and respond in the same way as the con-
federates, despite it clearly being the wrong
answer. Once the experiment was completed,
the “real” participant was individually inter-
viewed where he was debriefed about the
true purpose of the study. An examination
of all critical trials in the experimental group
revealed that one third of all responses were
incorrect. These incorrect responses often
matched the incorrect response of the major-
ity group (i.e., confederates). Overall, in the
experimental group, 75 percent of the par-
ticipants gave an incorrect answer to at least
one question. The implications from Asch’s
research are great. The demonstrated ability
of individual people to collate information
about group norms, others’ judgments, and
their own perceptions of themselves as group
members has influenced research in social
identity and social categorization theories.
Asch’s emphasis that independent thought
and disagreement among group members
are the crux of group functioning influenced
psychologists such as Serge Moscovici in his
minority influence theory. Asch also believed
that the relationship between conformity and
nonconformity was not a simple correspon-
dence of opposites; instead, each element
is part of wider, sometimes non-mutually
exclusive social processes. For example, con-
formity could simultaneously be a function
of how aware a person is that they are being
influenced by the group (distortion of per-
ception), the degree to which the person
believes that the group consensus is correct
(distortion of judgment), and the extent to
which the person is seeking group acceptance
(distortion of action) (Levine 1999).
Stanley Milgram’s experiment (1963, cited
in Hogg and Vaughan 2014) on obedience is
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perhaps the most famous social psycholog-
ical experiment of all, continually inspiring
further research, in an effort to “open up new
perspectives on an old experiment whose
legacy lives on” (British Psychological Society
2015). Milgram’s experiments (there were
several variations) examined the extent to
which “naive” participants would be willing
to ostensibly cause harm to another person
under direct orders from a scientist. The
scientist was, of course, a confederate of
the experimenters. The experiments began
in July 1961, at Yale University. Milgram
designed the experiment in an attempt to
address the frequently voiced concerns from
the general public seeking to understand how
the Holocaust could have happened, how
ordinary people could have been accomplices
to the horrors, and why only a few people
would refuse to participate.
In a typical Milgram experiment, three
individuals would be involved: the “scientist”
(the person giving the orders), the subject
(a naive volunteer), and a confederate of
the experimenter, who pretended to be a
volunteer. Thus, the experiment comprised
the Experimenter (an authoritative role), the
Teacher (a role intended to obey the orders
of the Experimenter), and the Learner (the
recipient of stimulus from the Teacher).
The teacher and the learner would be asked
to randomly draw paper out of a hat to
determine their roles; in reality, these roles
were fixed so that the subject was always
guaranteed to be the teacher. The “teacher”
and “learner” were separated into different
rooms where they could communicate over
an intercom but not see each other. The
teacher would be told to administer electric
shocks to the learner from an electroshock
generator located in the experimental room,
in full view of the teacher, if and when the
learner gave an incorrect answer to a task.The
teacher was thus lead to believe that they were
administering an increasingly high electric
shock with each wrong answer. Of course,
there were no electric shocks – just very well
acted and increasingly desperate actions from
professional actors. For example, the actors
would begin with moans and shrieks, ending
up with banging on a wall, culminating in
silence. Some participants indicated their
wish to stop the experiment; most contin-
ued although not without significant and
obvious discomfort (participants were sweat-
ing, trembling, stuttering, biting their lips,
groaning, digging their fingernails into their
skin, and some were even having nervous
laughing fits and even seizures!). A series
of verbal instructions (“Please continue”)
were given whenever a participant indicated
that they wanted to stop the experiment. If
the participant still wished to stop after all
four successive verbal prompts, the exper-
iment was halted. Otherwise, it was halted
after the subject had given the maximum
450-volt shock three times in succession. In
Milgram’s first set of experiments, 65 per-
cent (26 of 40) of experiment participants
administered the experiment’s final mas-
sive 450-volt shock. This occurred despite
the significant discomfort – at some point,
every participant paused and questioned the
experiment; some said they would return the
money they were paid for participating in
the experiment. The experiment’s fame and
infamy are such that it continues to invite
reinterpretations explaining the findings,
ranging from personal determinants, such as
personality (e.g., sadism, but this is unlikely
given the distress exhibited by participants),
to situational determinants, such as physical
and emotional proximity of learner to the
experimenter (experimenter and participant
in same room), which reduced obedience
but only to approximately 30 percent. Recent
explanations include a focus on the subtle
mechanisms of compliance and resistance
of interpersonal dynamics, which may have
been evident not only in the experiments
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mentioned here but also in Nazi Germany
(Reicher and Haslam 2011). “Engaged (or
identified) followership” suggests that par-
ticipants did not resists because they felt
themselves to be engaged in the wider project
to benefit humankind, impressed on them
by the sophisticated arguments of the skillful
“salesman” Milgram. Reicher and Haslam
(2011) suggest that rather than being dis-
tressed by their experiences (as some have
claimed), the participants were delighted to
take part, felt honored by the opportunity
and were therefore committed to the grand
project (science) that the experiment rep-
resented. They would have done whatever
Milgram asked because they believed in him,
demonstrating “engaged (or identified) fol-
lowership,” not mindless conformity. Reicher
and Haslam’s (2011) research extrapolates
from the social influence experiments to
answer the question, “How do genocides
happen?”: It was not blind obedience that
motivated Milgram’s subjects and Himmler’s
squads inNaziGermany but rather, a “labor of
love” where ordinary people were committed
to a greater, benefits-for-all, grand plan.
The Stanford prison experiment was
designed to examine how people respond to
assigned roles and their subsequent behavior
as a consequence of that internalized role.
In reality, the results of this experiment have
been able to highlight many social psycho-
logical processes such as the relationship
between authority and those without power,
deindividualization, depersonalization, and
interpersonal aggression, among others. The
experiment was conducted at Stanford Uni-
versity from August 14–20, 1971, by a team
of researchers led by psychology professor
Philip Zimbardo. It was funded by the United
States Office of Naval Research and was of
relevance to that department because of an
interest in the causes of conflict between
military guards and prisoners, the main
hypothesis to be tested being whether it is the
prescription of the role rather than person-
ality/internal dispositions that cause violent
behavior in society. Twenty-four “psycho-
logically stable” male students were selected
for the experiment; they were randomly
assigned to the roles of prisoner and guard in
a mock prison constructed in the basement
of Stanford University buildings. Given the
hypothesis, the participants were screened
to exclude those with criminal background,
psychological impairments, or medical prob-
lems. Half of the participants were randomly
allocated the role of guard while the other half
were randomly selected to be prisoners. Zim-
bardo himself was the superintendent and
a research assistant was selected to play the
part of warden. The guards were specifically
instructed not to physically harm the prison-
ers although they could introduce behaviors
which would create boredom, fear and, most
importantly, a sense of powerlessness and
lack of control.The guard has various “props”
such as wooden batons and was dressed in
similar ways to real American prison guards.
They also had mirrored sunglasses to prevent
eye contact. Prisoners wore uncomfortable
ill-fitting smocks and stocking caps, as well
as a chain around one ankle. Guards were
instructed to call prisoners by their assigned
numbers, sewn on their uniforms, instead
of by name. The prisoners, aided by the Palo
Alto police department, were arrested at their
homes, finger printed, and photographed.
Theywere also strip searched.The smallmock
prison cells were set up to hold three prison-
ers each and the prisoners were to stay in their
cells all day and night until the end of the
study. The guards worked in teams of three
for eight-hour shifts. The guards did not have
to stay on site after their shift. The continuing
fascination with this experiment is because
of what happened next. After a relatively
uneventful first day, on the second day several
prisoners blockaded their cell door, refusing
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to come out, or follow the guards’ instruc-
tions. Guards from other shifts volunteered
to work extra hours to assist in subduing
the revolt, and subsequently attacked the
prisoners physically and brutally, with batons
and fire extinguishers. During the next day,
another prisoner began to act out of control,
screaming, shouting, and raging. Further
issues arose as the guards asked prisoners
to participate in dehumanizing tasks, for
example, asking the prisoners to repeat their
assigned numbers and using these counts to
harass the prisoners, using physical punish-
ment such as protracted exercise for errors
in the prisoner count. Sanitary conditions
declined rapidly, exacerbated by the guards’
refusal to allow some prisoners to urinate or
defecate anywhere but in a bucket placed in
their cell. As punishment, the guards would
not let the prisoners empty the sanitation
bucket. Mattresses were a valued item in the
prison, so the guards would punish prisoners
by removing their mattresses, leaving them
to sleep on concrete. Some prisoners were
forced to be naked as a method of degra-
dation. Several guards became increasingly
cruel as the experiment continued; exper-
imenters reported that approximately one
third of the guards exhibited genuine sadistic
tendencies. Most of the guards were upset
when the experiment concluded. Although
the prisoners initially revolted, they grad-
ually became passive and subdued. Some
prisoners had to be released early because
they exhibited severe emotional disturbance
such as uncontrolled crying, screaming,
and disorganized thinking. On August 20,
1971, Zimbardo officially terminated the
experiment, after only six days instead of the
anticipated two weeks, on prompting from
another student and Zimbardo’s future wife,
Christina Maslach, who, it was noted sur-
prisingly by Zimbardo, was the only person
out of a group of about fifty researchers that
raised any kind of ethical andmoral objection
to the unfolding events. The results of the
experiment have been argued to demon-
strate the impressionability and obedience of
people when provided with a powerful and
legitimizing ideology, and social and institu-
tional support. Other explanations include
uncertainty of role reduction (Reicher and
Haslam 2006), the power of authority, and
mindless conformity, among others.
DEBATES IN THE FIELD
By the late 1970s, tensions between positivism
and social constructionismbecame an impor-
tant issue in American and European social
psychology. The tensions centered around
a crisis of confidence in positivism, which
brought on the emergence of alternative
explanations of social behavior such as social
constructionism. Frequently referred to as
the “turn to language,” the “discursive turn,”
or the “crisis” in social psychology, these
philosophical debates were predicated upon
an increasing dissatisfaction with the realist,
experimental ontology, and epistemology of
positivism.
Historically, viewing social psychology
through a scientific, positivist lens is a rela-
tively recent development not only for social
psychology, but also for the natural sci-
ences more generally. The modern scientific
method represented a major shift in human
epistemology and knowledge acquisition:
Modern scientific methods, invented in the 16th
Century, were not only a stunning technical
innovation, but a moral and political one as well,
replacing the sacred authority of the Church
with science as the ultimate arbiter of truth.
(Riger 1992: 730)
Positivism, as a philosophical paradigm,
can be characterized by its realist ontolog-
ical position, its priority of individualistic
cause and effect relationships between social
phenomena, statistical manipulation, and
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the fundamental belief that real and valid
knowledge can only be garnered through
empiricism (Gergen 1973; Fox, Prilleltensky,
and Austin 2009). More specifically, posi-
tivistic accounts seek to use experiments to
produce value free knowledge, unburdened
by partiality and positioning. Historically, the
positivistic approach emerged globally fol-
lowing the Enlightenment, where the Church
and religion, as long-held gatekeepers of
knowledge about the world, began losing
their power in Western societies. Scientists
emerged as the new generators and bastions
of knowledge, with a program designed to
acquire new forms of explanation which were
objective, independent of human bias and
therefore not imbricated in the previously
religious struggles for power. Indeed, an
influential early text by William McDougall,
published in 1908, epitomized these strug-
gles, jostling for position between clerics,
philosophers, and biologists. As reader at
the University of Oxford, McDougall had
been forbidden by the industrialist funder
of the readership, Henry Wilde, to carry
out experimental research in psychology
(which is exactly what he proceeded to
do!): “He (Henry Wilde) was an old man-
ufacturer who has a great admiration for
John Locke and a conviction that mental
life cannot be experimentally studied; and
he had learned that I had been guilty of
efforts along that line” (McDougall 1930:
207, cited in Hughes 2012). For social psy-
chology, in order to classify itself as a natural
science, it needed to adopt strong scien-
tific principles. Thus, through the adoption
of the hypothetico-deductive (experimen-
tal) method, social psychology took on a
realist ontological position which assumed
that the material world exists indepen-
dently of thoughts, actions, and intentions.
Given these assumptions, social psychology
began to seek the “truth,” in the same way
as the natural sciences, by attempting to
understand the fundamental properties of
the world and human nature. Social psy-
chology sought to explain and understand
the social world through parts, proposi-
tions, and governed rules. These claims
to science brought social psychology a
new found status and it has remained pre-
dominantly positivistic ever since. Social
psychology was thus engaged in understand-
ing the “real” nature of human existence
and social interaction, through the gen-
eration of the laws of human behavior,
universal to human societies and applicable
to all.
The focus of social psychology on inves-
tigating what is observable and more or less
directly measurable, with an emphasis on
empiricism as the only way to generate accu-
rate and valid knowledge is, according to crit-
ics, potentially problematic for a discipline,
which attempts to offer an ecologically valid
explanation of human social life. With a high
frequency of use of controlled experimental
situations such as experiments and self-report
questionnaires, other critiques suggest that
social psychologists may struggle to accu-
rately determine the very processes that they
are trying to understand. For example, social
desirability in the form of politically correct
answers which portray the respondent in the
best possible light are a significant issue for
any type of experimental, observational, and
self-report research. A disproportionate focus
on individuals and the reification of theoreti-
cal and hypothetical social psychological con-
cepts such as attitudes and attributions added
to the critique. Although many significant
works emerged during this period, Potter and
Wetherell’s (1987) book entitled Discourse
and Social Psychology: Beyond Attitudes and
Behaviour stands out as a highly influential
account to lay out the social discursive princi-
ples of behavior. Discourse analysis, as theory,
methodology, and method, assert that reality
is constructed and made meaningful through
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discourse (Burr 2015). This is referred to as
the social production of meaning: meaning
produced between individuals through social
interaction. Language and discourse pro-
duce (construct) rather than reflect reality.
They construct it (social constructionism).
Language is an active phenomenon, inti-
mately bound up with action (e.g., where we
apportion blame for a crime will have direct
implications such as incarceration), it shapes
our lives and produces subjectivity (our roles
and identities). Methodologically, primacy is
given to qualitative methods, which often use
interview transcripts to study the how people
actively construct meaning in their lives.
The turn to language in social psychology
also occurred within wider developments of
critical theory in social psychology. Critical
social psychology focuses not only on lan-
guage and discourse but also on issue such
as diversity, empowerment, and advocacy.
One of critical psychology’s main criticisms
of conventional psychology is that it fails
to consider or deliberately ignores the way
power differences between social classes and
groups can impact the mental and phys-
ical well-being of individuals and groups
of people. It does this, in part, because it
tends to explain behavior at the level of
the individual. Critical social psychology’s
objectives are to emphasize social justice
and human welfare. Critical social psy-
chologists believe that social psychology’s
traditional theoretical and methodological
practices hinder social justice, are detri-
mental to many individual, communities
and oppressed groups, and support soci-
etal institutions that reinforce unjust and
unsatisfying conditions.Mainstreampsychol-
ogists too often shy away from the resulting
moral, social, and political implications of
value-laden practices (Fox, Prilleltensky, and
Austin 2009).
The social constructionist and critical
social psychological position are not without
their critics. The difficulties with “endless
reiterations of relativism” (on which basis can
one position be chosen over another?) are
great for social constructionism (although
critical realism (Parker 1992) and other posi-
tions on the realist-relativist epistemological
spectrum offer an apparent resolution). Posi-
tivist social psychology is also critical of social
constructionism and critical social psychol-
ogy because these approaches are considered
to lack reliability, replicability, often use small
sample sizes, and lack other scientific rigor.
It is clear that all of the above perspectives
have made a significant contribution to the
discipline, with a vibrant research community
working within each paradigm.The historical
backdrop and the political reasons for social
psychology’s emergence as a science are well
documented as are the issues within it which
have contributed to its tensions. However,
positivismhas also afforded social psychology
the status of science and the importance of
this should not be underestimated although
its drive to follow rigid experimental princi-
ples, it is questionable whether the approach
is truly able to capture the essence of human
social nature and interaction. Future social
psychologists can attempt to recapture the
“social” by investing more time and research
funding in mixed methodologies, which are
able to not only document the individual
but also the social experience and context of
human social behavior.
FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Future directions for social psychology
include continued developments in dis-
cursive and critical theories, use of mixed
methods, and to diversify into in the growing
disciplines of evolutionary social psychology
and social neuroscience. Drawing on Charles
Darwin’s evolutionary theory, evolution-
ary social psychology draws on Darwin’s
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principles of evolution and natural selection
to argue that social behavior is shaped by
these forces. Social neuroscience focuses
on the neurological and biochemical cor-
relates of social behavior through carefully
examining electro-chemical brain activity.
Biochemical markers such as saliva sam-
ples to measure stress and brain imaging
to observe social cognition are deployed to
explain human social interactions. It is likely
that these recent developments will be closely
aligned with wider changes such as globaliza-
tion, climatic, geopolitical, technological, and
economic movements. These, in turn, may
be reflected in the continuing importance of
social psychology as a discipline.
SEE ALSO: Discourse Analysis; Positivism;
Social Cognition; Social Constructionism;
Social Neuroscience
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